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Introduction
Enlightenment thinkers saw the universe as mechanistic and mathematics as the language in
which the universe is written. They viewed mathematics as eternal, as transcending human
minds, and as comprehensible by human beings. Thus mathematics, from their perspective, is
our best tool for understanding the secrets of nature. This outlook was nicely summarized by
Morris Kline: (Kline, 1953)

In brief the whole world is the totality of mathematically expressible motions of objects in
space and time, and the entire universe is a great, harmonious, and mathematically
designed machine.
From a Christian perspective, however, the Enlightenment outlook is flawed. It privileges
mathematics and science and dismisses other sources of knowledge such as intuition and divine
revelation. It identifies reason with mathematical thinking and empiricism, thus devaluing
reflections on ethics, values, justice, and origins. Although Descartes professed religious belief,
subsequent Enlightenment thinkers tended to view human intellectual capabilities as sufficient
for ordering society and providing for peace and prosperity. Thus these thinkers privatized
religion and viewed it as an inappropriate topic of discussion in the public sphere. In short,
Enlightenment thought replaced God with a particular form of human reason - mathematics and
science.
The post-modem perspective is much less optimistic about mathematics. It tends to see
mathematical knowledge not as originating in the underlying structures and principles of nature
but in human thought, especially in natural language, its patterns, and its grammatical rules.
Mathematics is seen more as a social agreement and, as such, it has some usefulness, but it's not
seen as transcendent. For example, in 1998, Paul Ernest wrote, (Ernest, 1998)

To account for the apparent certainty and objectivity of mathematical knowledge I claim
first that mathematics rests on natural language, and that mathematical symbolism is a
refinement and an extension ofwritten language. The rules of logic and consistency which
permeate the use of natural language provide the bedrock on which the objectivity of
mathematics rests. Mathematical truths arise from the definitional truths of natural
language, acquired by social inter-action ... the truths of mathematics are defined by
implicit social agreement-shared patterns of behavior-on what constitute acceptable
mathematical concepts, relationships between them, and methods of deriving new truths
from old Mathematical certainty rests on socially accepted rules of discourse embedded
in our forms oflife. '
Postmodernism explicitly rejects modernism's claim of privilege for empiricism and mathematics
and is far more receptive to other ways of knowing. But it tends to see mathematics purely as a
human construct and to deny mathematics' transcendence. However, most mathematicians see
mathematics as having an independent identity, apart from their own minds. (Davis, 1981)
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So from a Christian perspective, neither approach seems satisfactory. Thus this paper presents an
alternative, one articulated by Augustine of Hippo, c. 400 A.D., long before the Enlightenment,
and argues that it is still a viable perspective today.
It first presents Augustine's views on the four classical questions of the philosophy of
mathematics:
What is the nature of mathematical objects? (The ontological question)
How do we obtain knowledge of them? (The epistemological question)
What is the meaning of "truth" in mathematics? How do we account for the certitude of
mathematical truths? (The truth question)
How do we account for the effectiveness of mathematics in describing the physical
universe? (The effectiveness question)
It then addresses Augustine's concept of reason. Next it discusses what has happened to
Augustine's perspective in the roughly 1600 years since he articulated it. It then addresses some
problems with both the Augustinian perspective and the more recent secular perspectives. And it
concludes with reflections on some implications of an Augustinian perspective on mathematics for
the practice of mathematics by Christian mathematicians and their students.

Augustine's views on the four basic questions
Augustine wrote around ninety books plus many sermons and letters. He addresses mathematics
in several places but his most detailed comments are in Book 2 of On Free Choice of the Will
(De Libera Arbitrio).i So my comments in this section will focus primarily on that work.
Before we can look at Augustine's treatment of the basic questions, we need to look at his use of
a few key words. Augustine was, of course, unaware of abstract mathematical structures like
groups, rings, and vector spaces. But he was familiar with geometry and number theory. His
discussion in De Libera Arbitrio centers on number. However, the Latin word, numerus,
translated as "number," also occasionally has the sense of"pattern," "form," or "structure."
Augustine uses numerus in this sense as well. Thus I am going to take "number" as conveying
an intuitive sense ofthe abstract structures that mathematicians have formalized in recent years.
Another key word is "truth." Augustine distinguishes "truths" and "Truth." A truth is a
necessary and therefore immutable proposition. Such truths are eternal and common to all minds
that contemplate them. Augustine gives some examples of truths:
One ought to live justly.
Inferior things should be subjected to superior things.
Like should be compared with like.
Everyone should be given what is rightly his.
The uncorrupted is better than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal, the invulnerable
than the vulnerable.
A life that cannot be swayed by any adversity from its fzxed and upright resolve is better
than one that is easily weakened and overthrown by transitory misfortunes.
Mathematical statements such as "7 + 3 = 10" are also examples of truths.
"Truth," however, comes close to being identified with God. Augustine even asks, "Is God
greater than truth or is the truth God?" and leaves this question unanswered. He describes Truth
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as a kind of light, possessed by all who perceive the same truths at a given moment but not
changed by any of them. It transcends our minds; in fact it rules them and is therefore
independent of them. It cannot be gained from sensible objects.
"Wisdom" is also a key word. At one point, he identifies wisdom with Truth, writing "For no
one is happy without the highest good, which is discerned and acquired in the truth that we call
'wisdom."' At another point, he identifies wisdom with Christ. De Libero Arbitrio is written as
a conversation between Augustine and his close friend, Euvodius. In response to Euvodius'
question, "I would very much like to know whether wisdom and number are both included in one
single class. For as you have pointed out, wisdom and number are associated with each other
even in Holy Scripture."ii Augustine replies with a third meaning for wisdom:
So, given the fact that both wisdom and number are contained in that most hidden and
certain truth, and that Scripture bears witness that the two are joined together, I very much
wonder why most people consider wisdom valuable but have little respect for number.
They are ofcourse one and the same thing.
The ambiguity of this terminology and the difficulties of translation make it hard to be
completely clear on how Augustine sees the relationship between God and mathematics. But I
think it's safe to say a few things, namely that Augustine sees truths as being eternal and
immutable propositions rooted in God's nature. Truths include (at least) the basic patterns
according to which the world has been created; wisdom is knowledge of these truths and is
closely identified with Christ.
Thus we can see Augustine's answer to the ontological question- he views numbers as ideas in
the mind of God that have been there from eternity and that God has used in creating the physical
universe. He says to Euvodius,
So, just as there are true and unchangeable rules of numbers, whose order and truth you
said are present unchangeably, and in common to everyone who sees them, there are also
true and unchangeable rules ofwisdom.
But wisdom gave numbers to everything, even to the lowliest and most far-flung things.
But when we begin to look above ourselves again, we find that numbers transcend our
minds and remain fixed in the truth itself
Etienne Gilson nicely summarizes this (Gilson, 1961). Augustinian ideas are
principal forms or stable and unchangeable essences of things. They are themselves not
formed, and they are eternal and always in the same state because they are contained in
God's intelligence. They neither come into being nor do they pass away, but everything
that can or does come into being and pass away is formed in accordance with them.
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On the epistemological question, Augustine regards mathematical knowledge as a priori
knowledge. He argues that our understanding of "one" cannot be empirical because we never
experience unity in this world - even if we encounter a single object, it can again be broken
down into a multitude of parts. Thus "oneness" must be an idea that we bring to our experiences
and that informs them. Similarly, he argues that mathematical knowledge cannot originate in our
bodily senses because we all have an intuitive understanding of infinity but we never experience
it. For both of these reasons, mathematical knowledge is more foundational than knowledge we
acquire through our senses. He asserts that the elementary truths of mathematics are neither
induced nor deduced but are present to all who think. In contemporary jargon, Augustine is
saying that the capacity to understand some truths such as the basic truths of mathematics was
hard-wired into our brains as part of our creation. This provides an explanation of how we, as
physical beings, are able to access truths that are not physical.
As for the truth question, mathematical truths are eternal, transcendent propositions independent
of human minds; their certitude comes from the fact that they originate in God's thoughts. The
answer to the effectiveness question is clear- mathematics is effective in helping us understand
the physical universe for two reasons: (1) God used the patterns expressed by mathematics in
creating the universe, and (2) God built the capacity to do mathematics into the human mind.
Thus there is a God-given correspondence between our thought and the structures of creation.

Augustine's views on reason
Augustine's perspective on the nature of reason is quite different from the Enlightenment
perspective. I will use it below in analyzing the secularization of mathematics that occurred after
about 1850. In De Libera Arbitrio, Augustine writes "For we know only what we grasp by
reason." He goes on to say that reason forms categories and definitions and organizes them.
Gilson offers an Augustinian definition of reason, that "Reason (ratio) is the movement whereby
the mind (mens) passes from one of its knowledges to another to associate or disassociate them."
A famous Augustinian adage is "Faith seeking understanding." That is, faith comes first,
understanding later. But faith does not precede reason- in fact, as Gilson expresses it,
... the very possibility offaith depends on reason ... Reason, then, is naturally present before
understanding, and before faith as well. If we were to. belittle or hate reason, we should
despise God's image within us and the very source of our preeminence over all other living
creatures.

This seems to set reason above faith, but in fact it does not. Gilson continues,
No one doubts that man can know the truth, say of mathematics, without faith. But here it
is a question ofdeciding whether reason can go back to the ultimate basis ofsuch truth and
so arrive at wisdom without having recourse to faith. Augustinism denies that it can do
so ... "

Vernon Bourke (Bourke, 1964) summarizes the Augustinian perspective like this:
The primary understanding to which Augustine laid claim is that nothing in the world can
be comprehended unless it be related to God ... If you think that you understand any being
without referring it to God, you are mistaken, as far as Augustine is concerned
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For Augustine, reason is not limited to science and mathematics but has a much broader scope.
It can handle any concepts and definitions including those that originate in God-given intuitive
knowledge and those that arise from divine revelation. Its scope includes those areas that the
Enlightenment excludes such as religion, ethics, values, justice, culture, and reflections on
origins. Thus, even though it is broader in some ways, it is limited- it cannot penetrate to the
bases of truth without faith and faith comes by grace. However, while basic mathematical ideas
are eternally part of God's intelligence, reason has a different ontological status. God does not
need to pursue a sequence of logical steps in order to come to an understanding of something;
rather all truth is immediately present to him. Thus reason is part of the created order.
Augustine discusses the origin and nature of reason in The City ofGod (Bettenson, 2003).iii

It is God who has given man his mind. In the infant the reason and intelligence in the mind
is, in a way, dormant, apparently non-existent; but of course, it has to be aroused and
developed with increasing years. And thus the mind becomes capable of knowledge and
learning, ready for the perception of truth, and able to love the good. This capacity
enables the mind to absorb wisdom, to acquire the virtues of patience, fortitude,
temperance, and justice, to equip man for the struggle against error and all the evil
propensities inherent in man's nature, so that he may overcome them because his heart is
set only on that Supreme and Unchanging Good. Man may indeed fail in this; yet, even so,
what a great and marvelous good is this capacity for such good, a capacity divinely
implanted in a rational nature!
In a recent talk at the University of Regensburg in Germany, Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope
Benedict XVI, spoke on faith and reason, expressing a classical Christian position (Benedict,
2007).

. .. the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal
Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which- as the Fourth
Lateran Council in 1215 stated- unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not
to the point of abolishing analogy and its language.
Benedict goes on to argue that to act inconsistently with reason it to act inconsistently with the
nature of God. Augustine would almost certainly have embraced this position.

From Augustine till1850
The central premise of the Augustinian approach, that in dealing with mathematics, we are
dealing with divine ideas, was widely held for nearly 1500 years. Thomas Aquinas differed on
some of the details- for example, he viewed mathematical knowledge as abstraction from
experience rather than as a priori knowledge as did Augustine- but he accepted the central
premise. The only serious challenge in the medieval period was nominalism- the philosophy
that there are only individuals and particulars, and that abstract concepts in general have no real
referents. Nominalism is most often associated with the work of William of Ockham in the first
half of the fourteenth century and while the debate between realism and nominalism became the
primary philosophical conflict of the late medieval period, nominalism never predominated.iv
One frequently quoted example of the Augustinian perspective is this statement by Johannes
Kepler,
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!was merely thinking God's thoughts after him. Since we astronomers arepriests of
the highest God in regard to the book of nature, it benefits us to be thoughtful, not
of the glory of our minds, but rather, above all else, of the glory of God. v
However, a major shift in this way of seeing mathematics began in the early seventeenth
century with Descartes; most scholars date the beginning of the Enlightenment to his work.
To Descartes, the world was mechanistic and its operations could be defined in
mathematical language. He was very optimistic about the capabilities of mathematics;
although he professed to be a religious believer, he began a movement toward seeing
mathematics not as originating in God's mind but as simply being a property of nature. He
wrote (Descartes, 1637)
The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are
accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations led me
to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are
mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from
us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, providing
only that we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in
our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another.
Another very influential perspective that vied with Augustine's was articulated by Immanuel
Kant. He took a position intermediate between realism and nominalism, sometimes called
empirical realism, which viewed abstract ideas as having a real existence but only as entities
.
shared among human minds. This removed mathematics even further from a grounding in God. vi
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that alternatives were debated, the Augustinian perspective was
still widely extant and logic, as well as mathematics, was seen as directly connected to religion.
In a recent work, a historian, Daniel Cohen (Cohen, 2007) points out that many mathematicians
in early nineteenth century England were clergy and that mathematics was often referred to in
sermons. Many well-known mathematicians saw a close connection between mathematics and
their faith. For example, August DeMorgan and George Boole saw their work in symbolic logic
as a means to resolve doctrinal conflicts among religious believers.
Although philosophers used symbolic logic in the twentieth century as a way to render
spiritual questions irrelevant, in the nineteenth century British intellectuals like Boote and
DeMorgan used it to rise above sectarian boundaries in the name of a true and universal
faith. Thus did antidogmatic and antidoctrinal thinkers attempt to provide a basis for a
national, even global, union of believers.
In fact, after Hoole's death, his widow, Mary Boole, wrote,

Mathematics had never had more than a secondary interest for him; and even logic he
cared for chiefly as a means of clearing the ground of doctrines imagined to be proved, by
showing that the evidence on which they were supposed to give rest had no tendency to
prove them. But he had been endeavoring to give a more active and positive help than this
to the cause of what he deemed pure religion. vii
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The post-1850 movement toward secularization
Beginning about 1850, though, a movement began that culminated in a virtual disappearance of
the Augustinian perspective from the mathematical community. Several factors contributed to
this process.viii One was the proliferation of apologetics using mathematics to argue for
theological truths. These were often poorly formulated and an embarrassment to the
mathematical community. So the community tended to distance itself from them. For example,
one such apologetic "proves" the Athanasian Creed -the creed is Trinitarian, but emphasizes
God's fundamental unity and his infiniteness. The argument amounts to the statement oo + oo +
oo = oo. Some significant events that occurred within mathematics also contributed. The
principal factors were the growing rigorization of mathematics, its increasing professionalization,
and the advent of non-Euclidean geometry.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, mathematicians began to be aware of some
inconsistencies in the treatment of calculus. Whereas Lagrange attempted to base all of calculus
on power series, functions were discovered whose power series did not converge to the original
function. Augustin-Louis Cauchy addressed these problems in part by developing the now
familiar E-8 definition of limit and the definition of continuity based on it. He went on to
"prove" rigorously that the sum of an infinite series of continuous function is continuous. When
counter-examples to this assertion were found, even more rigorous arguments were developed.
Thus rigor was very effective in resolving these and a number of other problems in analysis. But
some mathematicians objected to this growing rigorization on grounds that it made mathematics
remote and inaccessible to non-specialists (Richards, 1991). Others argued that this was not at
all undesirable - mathematicians had to deal with too many circle-squarers, angle trisectors, and
other amateur mathematicians. But because of it effectiveness in resolving fundamental
difficulties, rigor was established as the norm for carrying out mathematical arguments, thus
making mathematics considerably more professionalized. Descartes had already separated
mathematics from God; Kant separated it from nature; it now became more technical and was
separated from popular understanding.
The advent of non-Euclidean geometries continued this process. ix In fact, Bertrand Russell
wrote,

It has gradually appeared, by the increase of non-Euclidean systems, that Geometry throws
no more light on the nature of space than Arithmetic throws on the population of the
United States ... Whether Euclid 's axioms are true, is a question as to which the pure
mathematician is indifferent ... The [mDdern] geometer takes any set of axioms that seem
interesting and deduces their consequences. x
Russell's intellectual predecessor in studying mathematical logic, Gottlob Frege, saw logic as
expressing the laws of human thought. Russell agreed. (Cohen, 2007)

He marveled at giants of recent logic and mathematic such as Weierstrass, Dedekind, and
Cantor ... Yet Russell's praise of these pure mathematicians only superficially mimicked
early Victorian odes. What made these theorists so inspiring, he argued was not that they
unveiled God's thoughts, but that they gave us a much better understanding of the human
mind and the concepts we use without reflection.
From Russell's perspective, his crowning achievement in mathematics was his demonstration in
his Principles ofMathematics (1903) that the natural numbers can be derived from logic. The
natural numbers were the principal example that Augustine had used to locate mathematics in the
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mind of God. Thus Russell had completed a process that Descartes had begun - of establishing
mathematics as an autonomous entity with an identity that depended only on human beings.
Perhaps the most influential mathematician of the twentieth century, David Hilbert, succinctly
expressed this perspective: (Hilbert, 1927)

The fundamental idea of my proof theory is none than to describe the activity of our
understanding, to make a protocol of the rules by which our thinking actually
proceeds .. ~Already at this time I would like to assert what the outcome will be:
mathematics is a presuppositionless science. To found it, I do not need God or the
assumption of a special faculty of our understanding ... or the primal intuition of
Brouwer ... or finally, as do Russell and Whitehead, axioms of infinity, reducibility, or
completeness.
Thus by the early years of the twentieth century, the perspective that saw mathematics as the
study of divine ideas had largely disappeared.

Problems and questions
Realism, such as Augustine articulates, has encountered some serious obstacles since the late
nineteenth century. In fact, much of twentieth century philosophy of mathematics represents a
mixture of attempts by some scholars to replace realism and others to recover it.
For example, Russell's paradox presents one such problem. If God is infinite and omniscient
and if abstractions such as sets have a real existence in the mind of God, then presumably the set
of all sets also exists in God's mind. God can also easily make the distinction between those sets
that are members of themselves and those that are not. Thus Russell's paradox- that the set of
all sets that are not members of themselves both is and is not a member of itself- would say that
God's thoughts are contradictory.
Christopher Menzel has developed a plausible response to this paradox and others related to it
(Howell, 2001). Essentially, Menzel's response is that Russell's paradox is based on an
impredicative definition. That is, the process of forming a set is a collecting action- the
existence of the set {1, 2, 3} depends on the prior existence of 1, 2, and 3. Thus if S denotes a
collection of sets, the sets in the collection have to have been well-formed prior to being
collected. Asking whether Sis a member of itself assumes that Sis well-formed even though its
elements have not been collected. So the "paradox" is the result of an earlier inconsistent
assumption. Menzel then models set formation as just such a collecting activity in the mind of
God. Nevertheless, a great deal of work needs to be done to test how well the Augustinian
model can stand up to the critiques of realism in the recent philosophy of mathematics.
However, there are spiritual and intellectual problems with the secular approach as well. In
calling attention to these, I'm not attempting to turn the clock back to the pre-Enlightenment era.
Nineteenth and twentieth century mathematics represent monumental achievements that
Christian can strongly affirm. Rather it's that Christians "read" the significance ofthose
achievements differently.
Consider first the process of secularization that began with Descartes and culminated in Russell's
assertion that mathematics and logic represent nothing beyond the laws of human thought. There
is a spiritual problem here. The declaration ofhuman autonomyfrom God is the essence of sin;
thus a plausible Christian response to Russell and Hilbert's assertions of the autonomy of
mathematics is to see them as additional examples of this familiar phenomenon. There is also an
intellectual problem- if one accepts the notion that mathematical ideas existed in the mind of
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God prior to creation, the fact that mathematics can be separated from the physical universe is no
surprise. Also if one believes that the capacity to use reason was built into human minds by God,
the fact that logic expresses certain patterns or laws of human thought is equally unsurprising.
These observations simply point back to the creator. The implicit premise in Russell and
Hilbert's thought:

If mathematics can be cut loose from moorings in anything external to itself, then it doesn't
need God or anything external to human thought.
is a non sequitur.
Further weaknesses of the secular perspective are that it is unable to account for some important
facts: that humans have an extensive capability to engage in mathematics, that mathematics
provides such certitude, and that mathematics is so effective in describing physical reality. The
Enlightenment perspective also fractures human thought. That is, the Enlightenment defines
reason as empiricism and mathematics. But this view excludes ethics, culture, justice, values,
and religion, all of which are central to the life of the human community and, from a Christian
perspective, fall well within the scope of reason. Thus rather than glorifying human thought,
secularism drastically reduces the scope of reason. In mathematics, the consequences of this
have been severe: applied mathematics has been largely separated from ethics;xi the history and
philosophy of mathematics are rarely taught in mathematics graduate programs; any attempt to
establish a connection between mathematics and divine thought has come to be widely seen as
virtually irrational.

Conclusions
The Augustinian view of mathematics has much to commend it. It's inspiring - from this
perspective the capacity to do mathematics is a gift of God, its content originates in God, a
mathematical career is a calling to discover God's wonders, and it leads both to service of his
kingdom and to worship.
It also leads Christians to work for a more holistic view of mathematics. Twenty-first century
mathematics has already moved somewhat away from the decontextualized logicism of Russell
and the formalism of Hilbert. Nevertheless, their legacy still maintains a significant hold on the
discipline. A Christian perspective points toward a mathematics that is far more inclusive not
merely of applied mathematics but of history, philosophy, ethics, and culture and that sees
mathematics as one valuable thread in a much broader fabric of divine and human thought.
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Two translations are currently widely available. See Benjamin and Williams. Quotations here are from Williams'
translation.
1
The Scripture referred to here is Ecclesiastes 7:25. Augustine quotes this verse, presumably from the Septuagint.
Williams translates his quotation as "I went around, I and my heart, that I might know and consider and seek after
wisdom and number." The King James translation reads, "I applied mine heart to know, and to search, and to seek
out wisdom, and the reason of things ... " The New International Version translates this verse as, "So I turned my
mind to understand, to investigate, and to search out wisdom and the scheme of things."
1
Page 1072
1
See, for example, the Catholic Encyclopedia's article on the History ofDogmatic Theology at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14588a.htm and some ofthe links that can be reached from it.
1
This statement is often attributed to Kepler, but never with the source. I have included it here because it is so
widely quoted and such a clear example of the Augustinian perspective.
1
A thorough, well-written discu51)ion of these issues can be found at hup://www.friesian.com/universl.htm.
1
As quoted in Cohen, p. 77.
1
Cohen provides an excellent and detailed study of the process and the forces that drove it. My brief remarks here
are a summary of Cohen.
1
Kant was an "anti-realist." He believed Euclidean geometry was synthetic knowledge- a form imposed on the
world by our minds. Some historians of mathematics have viewed Kant's view that Euclidean geometry is an
integral part of human thought as an impediment to the development of non-Euclidean geometry. But, in another
sense, it helped lay the groundwork for it- that is, it advanced the project of separating mathematics from nature.
From a Kantian perspective, Euclidean geometry no longer had a tie to nature that gave it a special claim on truth.
1
As quoted in Cohen, p.l80
1
For example, operations research, the study of mathematical models of decisions, would appear to lend itself well
to the inclusion of ethics. But in fact, ethical issues are not addressed in OR textbooks and are rarely mentioned in
the literature ofthe field. In the early days of OR, the role of ethics was extensively debated. George Dantzig and
others who wanted ethics excluded ultimately prevailed on the grounds that they wanted the new discipline of OR to
be a "scientific" discipline. Most other branches of applied mathematics also rarely mention ethics. Statistics,
however, includes extensive work on ethics largely due to the influence of social scientists.
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